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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890546-CA 
v. : 
LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, and possession of a 
controlled substance, a class "B" misdemeanor, after a bench 
trial in the Third Judicial District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly found that 
defendant was not seized within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment when defendant voluntarily approached and initiated a 
conversation with the officer who had stopped his patrol car 
behind defendant's car in a parking lot. [A trial court's 
factual assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a 
motion to supress will not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. A "correction of 
error" standard is applied to a trial court's conclusions of law. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, (Utah 1989).] 
2. Whether the trial court correctly found that a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would still believe 
that they were free to leave when the officer asked defendant for 
identification. [A trial court's findings are clearly erroneous 
factual assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a 
motion to supress will not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. A "correction of 
error" standard is applied to a trial court's conclusions of law. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, (Utah 1989).] 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit ct 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Leroy Raymond Jackson, was convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1989) and possession of a controlled substance, to wit: 
marijuana, a class MBM misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989) after a bench trial on July 
11, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
Judge, presiding (R. 41-42). Judge Murphy sentenced defendant to 
a term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison on the 
felony conviction and six months in the Salt Lake County Jail on 
the misdemeanor conviction. Ixi. The prison term was stayed and 
defendant was placed on probation on the condition that he serve 
six months in the Salt Lake County Jail to run consecutively to 
his jail term on the misdemeanor conviction. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 24, 1989 at about 1:00 a.m., Officer Jed Hurst 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed defendant's 
vehicle travelling westbound on 1700 South at about Main Street 
in Salt Lake City. (T. 2, 6). Suspecting that defendant's 
vehicle matched the description of a vehicle involved in a 
robbery, Officer Hurst made a U-turn and began to follow 
defendant's vehicle for the purpose of running a license plate 
check (MS. 14-17). After following defendant's vehicle for a 
minute or less, defendant pulled into a parking lot adjacent to 
the Fox Lady Bar (MS. 15, 23) (T. 8). Hurst was unable to run 
The transcript of proceedings dated July 7, 1989, will be 
referred to as "MS." e.g., (MS. 1). The transcript of 
proceedings dated July 11, 1989, August 14, 1989, and October 2, 
1989, will be referred to as "T." e.g., (T. 1). 
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the license plate check before defendant pulled into a parking 
stall (MS. 17). Hurst did not attempt to signal defendant to 
stop in any way (T. 8). 
Defendant put his car in park, exited his vehicle, and 
began to walk toward Hurst's car rather than towards the bar (MS. 
18) (T. 9). At this time, Hurst's vehicle was still moving 
through the parking lot (T. 9). Hurst stopped his vehicle 
approximately one car length behind defendant's vehicle, exited 
his vehicle, and walked toward defendant (MS. 18) (T. 9-10). 
Hurst recognized defendant from a previous encounter 
and recalled defendant's last name (MS. 18) (T. 17-19). Hurst 
asked defendant if he was Mr. Jackson (T. 17). Defendant 
responded, "I am Mr. Jackson." (T. 17). Hurst ask€*d, "Do you 
have some I.D.?" (MS. 24). Defendant offered a Checkmart I.D. 
with his name and picture on it (T. 10). Because Hurst had often 
found Checkmart I.D.'s to be false and because he had just 
observed defendant driving a vehicle he asked, "Do you have a 
driver's license?" (MS. 26). Defendant responded that he did not 
(Ms. 26). Hurst asked, "Why don't you have a driver's license?" 
(MS. 26). Defendant responded that it had been taken away (T. 
11). 
Hurst then asked defendant for a vehicle registration 
(MS. 27) (T. 11). Defendant responded that he did not have a 
vehicle registration because he had recently purchased the 
vehicle. Ijd. After running a license plate and driver's license 
check, Hurst discovered that the license plate on defendant's 
vehicle was stolen and defendant's driver's license had been 
suspended (MS. 29) (T. 12). Hurst placed defendant under arrest 
for possession of stolen property and driving on a suspended 
license (MS. 30) (T. 13). A subsequent search of defendant's 
person revealed two small tin foil bindles of cocaine and a 
marijuana cigarette (T. 14, 34f 37). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A "seizure" occurs when a reasonable person in view of 
all the circumstances believes he or she is not free to leave. 
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not seized 
when defendant exited his vehicle and began to approach the 
officer before the officer had stopped his vehicle behind 
defendant's vehicle. The mere fact that the officer stopped his 
vehicle behind defendant's unoccupied vehicle did not create a 
seizure of defendant's person. In view of all the circumstances, 
the trial court reasonably found that defendant initiated the 
police encounter and that he did so voluntarily. 
The trial court also concluded correctly that defendant 
was not seized when the officer asked defendant for 
identification. An officer may approach a citizen and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his or 
her will. The court properly found that under the circumstances 
of the present case, a reasonable person would believe that he or 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT INITIALLY 
SEIZED. 
On appeal, defendant contends that he was illegally 
2 
seized without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. He 
argues that a seizure of his person occurred when Officer Hurst 
parked his patrol car behind defendant's vehicle in a parking 
lot. He requests this Court to reverse the trial court's refusal 
to suppress the controlled substances found on his person 
pursuant to a search incident to arrest. 
This case turns on whether or not defendcint was 
initially seized. A "seizure" under the fourth amemdment occurs 
when a reasonable person in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident believes he or she is not free to 
leave.3 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
Example of circumstances indicating a seizure are as follows: 
(1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display 
of a weapon by an officer, (3) some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or (4) the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might 
be compelled. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
2 
Because defendant does not support his claim with separate 
state constitutional analysis, this Court should consider 
defendant's claim based solely on federal constitutional grounds. 
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1372 n.12 (Utah 1989). 
3
 As this Court noted in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 n.3 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), a majority of the United States Supreme 
Court has been unable to agree on the precise paramters of when a 
"seizure" occurs in a "stop and frisk" situation. 
392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
207 and n.6 (1979); 3 W LaFave, Search and Seizure 53-55 (1978)). 
See also State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
As the Court explained in Mendenhall, the purpose of 
the fourth amendment is not to prohibit all contact between the 
police and the citizenry, but to prevent arbitrary and oppressive 
intrusion by the police upon a citizen's liberty interests. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54. Thus, not every street encounter 
between a citizen and the police invokes constitutional 
safeguards. Id. Nothing in the federal constitution Mprevent[s] 
a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 37 (White, J., concurring). So long 
as the person being questioned "remains free to disregard the 
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that 
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution 
require some particularized and objective justification." 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. 
In Mendenhall, the defendant was approached by two 
agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency in an airport terminal. Id. 
at 547. The agents identified themselves and asked to see her 
identification and airline ticket. JEd. at 547-48. She gave them 
her driver's license and airline ticket and answered several 
brief questions. Icl. at 548. When asked, she agreed to accompany 
the agents to an airport office where a body search was conducted 
by a female police officer which revealed contraband. Id. at 548-
49. 
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The district court denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress, finding that the agents had specific and articulable 
facts which justified a suspicion of criminal activity. Ld. at 
549. However, the opinion of the Supreme Court, authored by 
Justice Stewart with Justice Rehnquist concurring, held that no 
4 
"seizure" occurred on the facts of the case. 3^ d. at 555. 
Reviewing the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the Court 
noted that: (1) the agents wore no uniforms; (2) the agents 
displayed no weapons; (3) the agents did not summon the defendant 
to their presence; and (4) the agents requested, but did not 
demand, the defendant's identification and ticket, :id. at 555. 
In sum, the Court stated that the defendant did not have any 
objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the 
conversation and proceed on her way. Id. 
In reviewing a seizure issue on appeal, it is well-
accepted that the trial judge is in the best position to 
determine the reasonableness of the conduct under the particular 
facts of each case. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 86-87. A 
trial court's factual assessment underlying a decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless the trial court's assessment is against the clear weight 
of the evidence or the appellate court is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Ashe, 
Justice Powell filed a separate opinion concurring in part in 
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560-66. Powell's opinion concluded that 
the question of whether the defendant was "seized" need not be 
reached since the agents had reasonable suspicion to detain her. 
Id. 
745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). See also, State v. Menke, 787 
P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1990). However, the appellate court must 
apply a correction of error standard in the application of the 
law to the facts. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87. 
Applying fourth amendment standards to the facts of 
this case, no illegal seizure occurred. Prior to trial, 
defendant moved to suppress the contraband on the basis that it 
was the fruit of an illegal seizure of his person in violation of 
his fourth amendment rights (R. 33-34). At an evidentiary 
hearing held on July 7, 1989, Officer Hurst testified that he was 
following defendant's vehicle to run a license plate check 
because of his suspicion that defendant's vehicle matched the 
description of a vehicle involved in a robbery (MS. 14-16). 
Hurst did not make any attempt to stop the vehicle (MS. 16). 
Before a license plate check could be performed, defendant pulled 
into a parking lot adjacent to the Foxy Lady Bar (MS. 15-16). 
Hurst followed defendant's vehicle and waited in the driveway 
while defendant maneuvered his vehicle into a parking stall (MS. 
17). Hurst remained in his vehicle because he was uncertain 
whether defendant's vehicle was going to remain in the parking 
lot (MS. 17-18). After parking his vehicle, defendant exited and 
began walking toward's Hurst's vehicle (MS. 18). Hurst then 
stopped his vehicle behind defendant's vehicle, exited, and began 
to walk towards defendant. Id. While Hurst admitted that a 
fence blocked the front of defendant's vehicle, he testified that 
he simply parked behind defendant's vehicle and not that he 
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blocked defendant's vehicle (MS. 23-24). No other witnesses 
testified at the suppression hearing. 
Based upon Hurst's testimony, Judge Murphy denied 
defendant's motion to suppress. Judge Murphy clearly explained 
his ruling as follows: 
THE COURT: All right. I am prepared to rule 
on this at this time. At the time the 
officer pulled in back of the automobile 
there was no articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity on defendant's part. There 
was, however, at that time no stop. The 
officer was free to pull up where he wished 
in the parking lot. It is true that the 
defendant could not pull the car away. 
However, the defendant was free to walk 
wherever he wanted. He chose instead, 
voluntarily, of walking on either side of the 
car to walk to the bar, he chose to approach 
the officer. The officer then engaged him in 
conversation, asking for identification. 
Still no stop. 
The defendant voluntarily provided 
information. As the defendant responds to 
questions at the time which he [had] not been 
stopped and not detained, then the officer's 
suspicions are aroused by defendant's failure 
to have a drivers license while he was 
clearly just momentarily before driving, and 
the defendant being unable to produce a 
registration for the vehicle in which he was 
driving. At that point the officer did have 
an articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
in that the defendant was driving a vehicle 
without a license and was unable to produce 
information indicating his right to be in the 
vehicle and have possession of it. The stop, 
then, occurs at that time and the officer had 
an articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, and it was from that that the 
substance which at least to this point the 
court only knows to be a white substance, was 
collected from the vehicle and that substance 
will not be suppressed. 
(MS. 48-50). In sum, Judge Murphy found that defendant was on 
foot and voluntarily chose to approach Hurst. He rejected 
defendant's claim that defendant was personally seized when Hurst 
stopped his vehicle behind defendant's unoccupied vehicle. 
Because no seizure occurred, no constitutional protections were 
invoked. 
Applying the Mendenhall circumstances test, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate a seizure. First, there was no 
threatening presence of multiple police officers. Second, there 
was no display of a weapon by an officer. Third, there was no 
physical contact between defendant and the officer. Finally, 
there was no indication that compliance with the officer's 
request would be compelled. In fact, Hurst made no request 
verbally or otherwise that defendant stop, approach, or answer 
questions. Thus, Judge Murphy's findings of fact at the pretrial 
motion to suppress are not against the clear weight of the 
evidence. 
At trial, defendant renewed his motion to suppress on 
the same grounds. Hurst further testified that he did not 
attempt to stop defendant and that defendant was free to walk 
away after exiting his vehicle (T. 8-9, 12). Hurst believed that 
defendant was approaching him because defendant desired to speak 
with him (T. 25-26). Had defendant simply walked toward the bar, 
Hurst stated that he would have asked defendant if he would talk 
to him (T. 26). If defendant had re-entered his vehicle and 
attempted to leave, Hurst testified that he would probably have 
allowed defendant to leave since he had no reason to stop 
defendant (T. 27). However, Hurst stated that he would have 
demanded a driver's license had defendant simply walked away 
-11-
5 
after producing only a Checkmart I.D. Id. 
Based upon this additional testimony, Judge Murphy 
again denied defendant's motion to suppress. Judge Murphy ruled 
as follows: 
I think it's appropriate in connection with 
the renewal of the motion to suppress that I 
make specific findings on that, and therefore 
I do find there is no articulable suspicion 
to stop the defendant prior to the time that 
the officer indicated that he had placed the 
defendant under arrest. 
The officer, Officer Hurst, admitted as 
much on cross examination, and the court so 
finds. 
The court further finds that defendant 
exited his car and approached the police car 
on foot before the police car stopped. It 
was thus the defendants [sic] voluntary act 
that caused the encounter between the 
defendant Mr. Jackson and Officer Hurst, not 
the officer's conduct. 
The police officer, upon stopping, 
however, did block the automobile, and for me 
to find otherwise, frankly, would be 
intellectually dishonest. 
Upon the encounter initiated by the 
defendant, the police officer engaged the 
defendant in no conversation except that of 
seeking identification. It was reasonable 
that the police officer would expect an 
identification initially in the form of a 
drivers license, and therefore, it was 
reasonable for him to ask for a drivers 
license, given his problems with Checkmart 
identifications. 
5 
The officer's state of mind is not relevant in determining 
whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free 
to leave except insofar as the officer's overt actions 
communicate that state of mind. People v. Ross, 217 Cal.App.3d 
879, 217 Cal.Rptr. 921, 923 (Cal.Ct.App. 1990). 
Up to that point there had been no stop 
and no invocation of the Fourth Amendment, 
because a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position, considering the conduct 
of Officer Hurst, would have believed he was 
still free to leave. Upon defendant's 
statement that he had no drivers license, a 
reasonable suspicion arose that a crime or 
infraction had been committed, that is, 
driving without a license, and the defendant 
had committed that crime or infraction. 
And therefore, at that time there was a 
basis for a stop under the Terry case, and 
only thereafter did a stop occur. I think 
it's important to consider those facts in 
connection with the case law that has been 
presented to me. 
(T. 51-53). Having made these findings, Judge Murphy proceeded 
to discuss the case law cited by defendant (T. 53). In general, 
Judge Murphy distinguished defendant's cases on the facts by 
pointing out that defendant, unlike the cases cited by defendant, 
was not in his vehicle and had initiated the encounter by 
approaching Hurst's vehicle before it had stopped (T. 53-55). 
Given Judge Murphy's finding of fact that defendant 
voluntarily initiated the encounter as a pedestrian, defendant 
fails to come forward with any factually similar case law which 
reaches a different result applying fourth amendment legal 
standards. This Court should not reverse Judge Murphy's legal 
conclusions where the record indicates that he correctly applied 
Defendant cites the following cases: State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 
879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (officer stopped defendant's vehicle for 
traffic violation by blocking defendant's car in parking lot; 
defendant in vehicle when stopped); United States v. Kerr, 817 
F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1989) (officer stopped defendant's vehicle by 
blocking one lane driveway as defendant was backing out); People 
v. Guy, 121 Mich.App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435 (1982) (officer 
initiated encounter by partially blocking driveway and 
approaching vehicle). 
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the proper legal standards to the facts of the case* Neither 
should this Court upset Judge Murphy's factual findings where 
they are based upon the clear weight of the evidence consisting 
solely of the officer's testimony. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SEIZED WHEN THE OFFICER 
ASKED FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
Defendant argues that assuming he was not seized when 
the officer blocked his car, he was seized when the officer asked 
defendant for identification. He claims that the trial court 
clearly erred in finding that he was not seized when asked for 
identification. Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
As stated above, the test for determining whether a 
person was seized is an objective test which considers whether a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would believe he or she 
is free to leave. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. A trial court's 
factual findings in this regard will not be disturbed unless they 
are clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 
1987) "Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." 
United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 819 (7th Cir. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1987), described the three levels of police encounters 
with the public which are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen 
at anytime [sic] and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable 
suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a 
crime, however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is 
being committed. 
Ld. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 
230 (5th Cir. 1984). Relating these three levels of encounters 
to the facts in Deitman, the Court concluded that the police 
encounter was a level one encounter. Ixi. at 618. The Court 
found that 'the police were justified in asking defendants for 
identification and an explanation of their presence in an area 
where police had responded to a burglar alarm." Ijd. The Court 
also found that the defendants were not detained against their 
will. Id. 
The Court distinguished the facts in Deitman from State 
v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), and State v. Carpena, 714 
P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), in which the defendants were stopped, 
detained, and searched without their consent. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
at 618. In contrast, the defendants in Deitman were not "stopped 
by the officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if 
he could talk to them." ^d. The defendants "crossed the street, 
produced identification on request, and were not detained against 
their will." Id. 
Likewise, defendant in the present case was not 
stopped, detained, or compelled to produce identification against 
his will. Hurst testified that he recognized defendant from a 
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previous encounter and could recall defendant's last name (MS. 
18) (T. 17-19). Hurst asked defendant if he was Mr. Jackson (T. 
17). Defendant responded, "I am Mr. Jackson" (T. 17). Hurst 
asked, "Do you have some I.D.?" (MS. 24). Defendant offered a 
Checkmart I.D. with his name and picture on it (T. 10). Because 
Hurst had often found Checkmart i.D.'s to be false and because he 
had just observed defendant driving a vehicle he asked, "Do you 
have a driver's license?" (MS. 26). Defendant responded that he 
did not (Ms. 26). Hurst asked, "Why don't you have a driver's 
license?" (MS. 26). Defendant responded that it had been taken 
away (T. 11). 
Judge Murphy specifically found that Hurst's request 
for identification was reasonable and that a reasonable person in 
defendant's position "would have believed he was still free to 
leave." (T. 52). Other than the previously discussed vehicle 
blocking, defendant fails to assert the existence of any 
circumstance which would indicate that defendant was being 
detained and compelled to produce identification. Officer 
Hurst's request for identification was clear and precise without 
any indication that compliance was mandatory. Presuming that the 
position of Hurst's vehicle did not create a seizure, the 
subsequent request for identification without more did not 
elevate the situation into a level two encounter requiring 
reasonable suspicion. 
Defendant further claims that Hurst's request for 
identification was unreasonable since Hurst recalled defendant's 
last name. He also claims that it was unreasonable to ask for a 
driver's license after defendant had produced a Checkmart I.D. 
Judge Murphy rejected these claims and found that it was 
reasonable for Officer Hurst to ask for a driver's license as 
identification given Hurst's prior difficulties with the validity 
of Checkmart identifications (T. 52). Logically, the type of 
identification requested should not alter the voluntary nature of 
the police encounter. 
Defendant cites several cases in support of his claim 
that he was detained without articulable facts supporting 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. While these cases are 
helpful in explaining fourth amendment standards, they are easily 
distinguishable on their facts. 
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979), the 
defendant was arrested after refusing to give his name and 
address to police officers. The officers had no articulable 
suspicion that the defendant was involved in any specific 
criminal misconduct. In contrast, defendant in the present case 
was not detained, was not compelled to produce identification, 
and was not arrested for failing to produce identification. 
In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the 
officer exceeded the lawful scope of a traffic stop when he 
opened the passenger door of the stopped vehicle. 3^d* at 1137. 
In the instant case, defendant was not detained and therefore 
Hurst could not have exceeded the scope of the detention. 
Finally, defendant argues in Point III of his brief 
that there was "no immediate need for an investigation." (See 
Brief of App. at 27-32.) He asserts that Hurst had no reasonable 
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suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigative 
detention. Because no fourth amendment detention occurred, it is 
unnecessary for the State to justify a detention. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
DATED this^^> day of May, 1990. 
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